An Incentive for Fisheries: Used for Resource Protection or for Economical Purposes?

The decline in fish species has been an unaddressed problem until recently. Even today, it is a major problem and although it is claimed that it has been confronted, the decline seems to be becoming more and more problematic. One incentive that has been suggested in certain cases (e.g. the orange roughy fishery case (Beder, 2009)) to stop this loss is the use of tradable fishing quotas, also called individual trading quotas (ITQ). At first glance, ITQs seem logical and effective. The total allowable catch (TAC) for a fishery is separated, individual quotas are given out, and people can trade these quotas if they desire to fish more. This should allow for the right amount to be fished, which would cause enough fish to remain for reproduction. However, due to problems caused by big quota holders and by a lack of rule enforcement, these quotas do not seem to be stopping people from overfishing.

In a blog post written by Benjamin Leard, the use of ITQs is seen as a good alternative to fishing regulations. Leard mentions the fact that with ITQs, there would be no more “pressure to harvest” (Leard, 2009), as there would be enough fish for all who own an ITQ. He also explains that a “strict monitoring system” (Leard, 2009) would be essential, and that satellites are helpful for this, using the European Union’s use of them as an example. Finally, he states that the National Oceanic Atmospheric Association (NOAA) has already taken steps towards the use of ITQs. If ITQs were to work as planned, these points would be true and the solution to collapsed fisheries would be solved. Nevertheless, the goal of ITQs is "to make the fleet more economically efficient” (Beder, 2009). The focus is therefore not on reducing the amount of species fished, but rather on making the fishing more successful economically. The trading of ITQs is encouraged so that fewer boats are used for fishing, reducing the amount of personal boats and increasing the amount of large powerful boats.

Large nets are used, able to “‘catch anything from a shrimp to a whale’ as well as ‘swordfish, sharks, birds and marine mammals’” (Hagler 1995:77, as cited by Beder, 2006). The nets often catch large quantities of immature fish, which are thrown back into the water and usually die from this. Nets used by large companies are usually dragged along the bottom of the fishery, destroying aquatic environments and therefore killing more of the fish and other valuable animals.

The problem with ITQs is that they do not account for all the fish that are thrown back into the water, and these are usually more numerous than the fish collected (Beder, 2006). The “pressure to harvest”, as mentioned by Leard, would then still exist and could even be higher than in the past, as there would be such a large amount of fish not considered when calculating the TAC. To prevent this, Leard suggested the use of satellites, but this is not possible for all countries. According to Beder, it is even expensive to have people monitoring onboard, making satellites absolutely out of the question. Other problems include people being dishonest about the amount fish in order to receive a higher quota, as well as people recording valuable species as similar, not as valuable species.

Individual trading quotas originally seem like an advantageous way of ensuring that only a certain amount of fish are taken out of their ecosystems. However, after considering the consequences linked to big fishing companies with their reckless fleets as well as the lack of proper monitoring, ITQs may actually be the cause of higher declines in fish species. A considerable amount of investment must be made to help regulate the amount of unusable fish being taken out and to improve monitoring systems in order to benefit from ITQs and to successfully preserve the ecosystems.

Resources

(As cited by the author): Sharon Beder, ‘The Corporate Agenda for Environmental Property Rights’, Property Rights and Sustainability, NZ Centre for Environmental Law Conference 2008, Auckland, April 2009. http://www.uow.edu.au/~/sharonb/property.html

Beder, Sharon. Environmental Principles and Policies. Sydney: UNSW Press, and London: Earthscan, 2006. Print.

Benjamin Leard. “Are Property Rights Key to Saving U.S. Fisheries?” http://www.aier.org/research/briefs/1793-are-property-rights-key-to-saving-us-fisheries. AIER, July 2009. Web. 24 Nov. 2009.